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Simon Upton
Fiscal and Other 
Risks over the  
Long Term
After 13 years’ absence from any involvement in public life in 
New Zealand it has been a welcome challenge to re-immerse 
myself in issues with which I used to be familiar.  I’d like 
to focus this article on why we should see the Treasury’s 
review of the government’s long-term fiscal outlook as an 
exercise in managing a wide range of risks under conditions 
of significant uncertainty; and how, from a political point 
of view, one might seek to stop the need for fiscal prudence 
sliding off the radar screen.1 
political or biological disaster (and those 
cannot be discounted), it will also be the 
most mobile world ever, raising profound 
questions about identity. We all know this 
but we don’t really understand what it 
will entail, which is why I feel instinctively 
nervous about telling people that we can 
engineer particular outcomes. 
Global environmental pressures
Geopolitical, social and environmental 
trends mean that the world in which 
future taxes and dividends are struck 
will differ significantly from the context 
in which current entitlements have been 
established. While we can describe the 
plausible direction of a number of these 
trends, the risks around them are not 
sensibly quantifiable. That doesn’t mean 
they can be ignored.
A much larger economy will place 
increasing pressure on the planet’s 
capacity to absorb waste and supply 
vital ecosystem services.3 Needless to 
say, New Zealand will become an even 
more vanishingly small element of a 
much less familiar geopolitical world. No 
country will be immune from the global 
environmental pressures of such a world, 
the impacts of which will be transmitted 
directly (as in the case of climate 
change) or indirectly (through declining 
environmental quality affecting global 
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Managing risk and uncertainty
Demographic transition
The issue of retirement income places 
the demographic transition we’re 
undergoing into sharp relief. The fact 
that the trajectory of ageing can be so 
precisely quantified, and the impacts 
modelled, lends a misleading sense 
of certainty to this whole debate. The 
phenomenon is painted as inexorable, 
quantifiable and manageable. In one 
sense it is, but we should also reflect on 
how unfamiliar the future might be. The 
world has never experienced ageing on 
the scale we’re about to live through.2
 Demographic ageing is not just a 
developed-country phenomenon. China 
will shortly start to age, before ever 
having fully developed. That ageing 
will occur in the most urban world we 
have ever experienced: from 30% urban, 
70% rural in 1950 we will by 2050 have 
exactly reversed those proportions 
(United Nations, 2011). Excluding 
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supply chains for goods and services).4 In 
some cases (notably airborne pollution) 
the ageing profile of OECD populations 
will place them at particular risk. 
As an open economy, New Zealand 
can expect to feel the consequences 
of rising resource scarcity and 
environmental damage through trade 
linkages and directly experience the local 
consequences of globally-induced climate 
change. Depending on the severity of 
environmental pressures, New Zealand 
could become an increasingly desirable 
destination for migrants, as well as benefit 
from demand for the biological output of 
its resource base in a world needing more 
food. 
The global scale of potential climate 
change has reinforced the impression that 
environmental change is the most likely 
source of catastrophic risk. This may not 
be so. For a carefully measured assessment 
of the relative orders of magnitude that 
can reasonably be attached to known 
risks, Smil (2008) is essential reading. 
On the basis of a rigorous assessment of 
the known statistical level of exposure 
to risk of fatality caused by large-scale 
catastrophic events, Smil identifies only 
one risk emanating from the natural 
world – a viral pandemic – to which 
a high probability of mortalities in 
the region of 100,000 can be attached 
within the next 50 years. He ascribes a 
similar level of probability to a mega-war 
(defined as a ‘potentially massive armed 
confrontation’). 
Natural disasters and climate change
Then there are natural hazards. New 
Zealand’s vulnerability to seismic and 
volcanic events is well known. I barely 
need to mention this after the Canterbury 
earthquakes. Natural disasters have the 
potential to impose economic shocks that 
knock New Zealand’s growth prospects 
and thereby undermine the government’s 
ability to raise tax revenue. Prudentially, 
New Zealand’s geological endowment 
requires the government to run its 
finances on the basis that it will have to 
face recurrent fiscal burdens in the same 
way countries like the Netherlands face 
water management expenditures, or 
other countries face significant defence 
expenditures for geopolitical reasons. A 
similar reasoning applies to New Zealand’s 
relatively high exposure to biological risk 
given the biological base of the economy. 
While not a ‘natural’ disaster in the 
same sense, anthropogenic climate change 
poses unknown but potentially significant 
economic risks within the horizon under 
consideration. Significant climate change 
is already locked in and global emissions 
trajectories suggest that the chances 
of holding average global temperature 
increases to 2 degrees are fast dwindling. 
The global community faces a choice in 
the next decade of either acquiescing in 
significant climatic disruption or costly 
adjustment because of the failure to take 
comprehensive measures over the last 20 
years. 
As with many countries, New 
Zealand’s stated acknowledgement of 
the risks is not matched by actions that 
can significantly reduce those risks. 
While the costs of placing economies at 
a competitive disadvantage from acting 
unilaterally are prominently advertised, 
the costs of a collective failure to act are 
discounted. This is a long-run challenge 
that will not go away, and the costs that 
will be encountered either adapting to 
the consequences or trying to limit their 
extent are likely to weigh on future growth. 
This places a further question mark over 
future growth scenarios based on benign 
assumptions about the physical world. 
Financial crises
One other class of risk to smoothly 
advancing prosperity deserves comment: 
financial crises. The financial sector is 
capable of delivering shocks with every bit 
as much impact as natural disasters. Such 
shocks can swiftly impose constraints on 
a government’s fiscal position for many 
years. 
Economic crises are not rare events. 
A recent study estimates that since 1970 
there have been a total of 147 banking 
crisis, 218 currency crises and 66 
sovereign debt crises. As the world is now 
well aware, this is not just an emerging 
markets phenomenon. Thirty-one of 
the 34 current OECD members have 
experienced at least one systemic banking 
crisis since 1970, and 32 have experienced 
at least one of a banking, currency or 
sovereign debt crisis over that period 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2012). 
Against this backdrop New Zealand 
is fortunate not to have been among 
those having experienced a banking 
crisis, although this may be as much 
a consequence of prudent Australian 
regulation governing our largely 
Australian-owned banking sector as of 
local conditions. Serial failures by other 
New Zealand financial intermediaries 
over the last 30 years have destroyed a 
significant share of private savings, which 
suggests that New Zealand has lacked 
important management skills and has 
failed to regulate appropriately. There is 
no room for complacency.
One specific source of economic 
vulnerability for New Zealand is its 
external indebtedness position and the 
risk of a ‘sudden stop’ in capital inflows 
if foreigners turn off New Zealand as an 
investment destination. Encouraged by 
New Zealand’s economic performance 
and prospects, sound institutions and 
policy settings, foreign investors have been 
willing to fund New Zealand’s sustained 
current account deficit. This has seen the 
net international investment position 
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expand to a net liability of over 70% of 
GDP (Statistics New Zealand, 2012a). 
Good management and a bipartisan track 
record of taking unpalatable political 
decisions when required has shielded New 
Zealand from greater investor scepticism. 
However, investor sentiment cannot be 
assumed to be unshakeable. A significant 
and sustained negative reappraisal of New 
Zealand’s risk profile could see GDP and 
employment fall as activity contracts and 
the fiscal position deteriorates. Only our 
institutions (like the policy debate this 
article is contributing to) and political 
probity keep those prospects at bay. 
Policy institutions
New Zealand policy makers are not alone 
in pondering what long-run trends mean 
for fiscal sustainability. The demography of 
OECD countries coupled with the rapidly 
increasing economic weight of emerging 
economies means that they are beginning 
to face competition for capital, resources 
and skills from a much less advantageous 
position than they have been accustomed 
to. What distinguishes New Zealand from 
many OECD countries is the fact that this 
enquiry is not taking place in response to 
an immediate fiscal or economic crisis but 
as part of an institutionalised process of 
periodic review. This, combined with the 
relative intimacy of New Zealand society 
and its less polarised political landscape, 
should enable a more measured trimming 
of the fiscal sails in advance of acute 
challenges arising. 
Whether or not this happens is, of 
course, another matter. New Zealand’s 
relative security has led to long periods 
of policy stagnation which, nevertheless, 
seem able to be surmounted when a 
crisis threatens. The crisis of the 1980s led 
to a remarkable policy response and the 
expenditure of a large amount of political 
capital (in terms of trust in political 
institutions). Rebuilding that trust has 
been a slow, hard-won business. 
The temptation now is to consolidate 
rather than take action. But the future is 
less accommodating than it was 30 years 
ago. New Zealand was one of the first 
OECD economies to promote a radical 
break with the postwar mixed economy 
consensus. While all OECD countries 
faced difficulties in the aftermath of 
the oil shocks of the 1970s, the crisis 
of public finances New Zealand faced 
was exceptional. Structural reform to 
promote growth played into a global 
economic outlook that, while difficult, 
was not plagued by the synchronised 
resort to austerity measures currently 
being experienced. There was room for 
a small open economy to exploit growth 
opportunities in a global marketplace 
that was expanding as trade barriers fell. 
Difficult structural adjustments could 
be pursued in a less demanding global 
climate. Many of New Zealand’s OECD 
partners still had relatively strong national 
balance sheets. 
In addition, a demographic ‘window’ 
was opening in which the demand for 
spending on the school-age cohort was 
moderating without any immediate 
increase in the population of retirees. 
Reversing an exceptionally low age 
of pension entitlement also managed 
to defer the worsening of the old-age 
dependency ratio (see note 2) by seven or 
eight years. That window has now closed. 
New Zealand faces the need to keep public 
debt levels under control and ensure that 
sound policy supports continued access 
to global capital markets by New Zealand 
businesses against the backdrop of the 
worst global economic recession in two 
generations and worsening demographic 
trends. 
Retirement income
A changing demographic structure 
presents a number of challenges in terms 
of what the state provides, to whom, and 
whose taxes fund it. Retirement income – 
primarily New Zealand Superannuation5 
– has been a particular lightning rod. 
Because the decision to pay pensions out 
of taxes relies on expenditure decisions 
that will be voted by elected officials 
far in the future, no one can say with 
certainty how a future parliament will 
regard any intergenerational bargain 
purportedly made on its behalf decades 
before its own election. Encouragement 
of savings provides a way for people to 
spread the risks by relying not just on 
future taxpayers but on returns from 
privately-invested capital. But again this 
is not without risk. Thirty or forty years 
from now, as savers set out to call in their 
annuities they will, with retirees around 
the world, find themselves in competition 
with relatively fewer workers whose 
bargaining position will be stronger, and 
the owners of industry whose views about 
dividend payments may not match those 
of pension fund managers. 
A more numerous retired population 
might be expected to seek to secure the 
election of a parliament that broadly 
represents its interests. But elections 
are an extremely imperfect mechanism 
for securing particular preferences. In 
deciding on the level and incidence of 
taxation, politicians are at the centre 
of a contest between the (partially 
overlapping) interests of the owners 
of capital (seeking dividends), workers 
(seeking remuneration) and voters. The 
outcome of the particular forces at work 
in some future economic and political 
setting is simply unknowable. All one 
can say is that for today’s working-age 
population to assume that rising claims 
on taxpayers will be met in the future on 
the basis of current sentiment would be 
very risky. 
The most cautious way to minimise 
these risks would be through a phased 
increase in the age of eligibility for 
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New Zealand Superannuation to match 
increasing life expectancy. A more 
ambitious approach would, in addition, 
consider an element of targeting. 
It might even seek to progressively 
establish a somewhat lower level of 
payment in relation to prevailing wages. 
Communicating the desirability of 
savings is an essential element of any 
such rebalancing of taxpayer risks, 
although I do not support making saving 
compulsory and I worry about the 
practicalities of targeting. 
Other emerging fiscal pressures and potential 
opportunities
Retirement income is only one driver of 
the emerging fiscal pressures and it would 
be unfortunate if the debate around New 
Zealand’s long-term fiscal outlook became 
all about retirement income. It is the wider 
bundle of services that needs to be 
considered, and the resilience of the 
economy and the tax system to meet the 
claims that are likely to be made of elected 
officials. Taking a wider view would lead 
one to focus as much concern on the 
apparently inexorable increase in foreign 
claims on output (through accumulating 
balance of payments deficits) as on parti-
cular government expenditure trends. As 
net borrowers, New Zealanders face the 
real possibility not only that governments 
may not deliver the social dividends they 
hope for but that access to the capital 
needed to generate new streams of income 
may be significantly limited. 
An optimistic forward-looking 
scenario would see global demographic 
trends as ultimately playing into New 
Zealand’s hands. A world with two billion 
more inhabitants within little more than 
a generation and widespread demand 
for more food on the part of a growing 
global middle class can only play to New 
Zealand’s strengths as a food producer. 
In that case, the rents from increasingly 
scarce soil and water might be sufficient 
to sustain rising living standards for 
the foreseeable future. The interesting 
political economy question is whether 
food producers should be allowed to keep 
the full benefit of those rents. The case for 
taxing the rents that soil, water and other 
resources provide cannot be ignored in 
a world in which capital and labour are 
so mobile and resources potentially more 
scarce. 
To this optimistic outlook might 
be added New Zealand’s geopolitical 
proximity to the region where the largest 
growth prospects are clustered, China 
and East Asia. It seems reasonably safe 
to assume an ongoing rise in Chinese 
influence in both economic and security 
spheres. But how far that influence will 
extend, and with what consequences 
for a tiny trading country like New 
Zealand, is impossible to say. China faces 
a multitude of long-term challenges 
which place a question mark over the 
inevitability of its ascent, including ‘an 
extraordinarily aberrant gender ratio, 
serious environmental ills, the increasing 
inequality of economic rewards, and its 
weak soft-power appeal’ (Smil, 2008).
These risks and uncertainties provide 
a compelling rationale for placing 
public finances on a more resilient 
basis. The Treasury’s 2013 review of the 
government’s long-term fiscal position 
is well timed. New Zealand is neither 
so rich (like Norway) that it isn’t under 
pressure, nor so fragile that it is forced 
to take precipitate action. Many OECD 
countries are being forced to take steps 
that are inevitably ad hoc and brutal. 
New Zealand has, for the moment, the 
opportunity to act pre-emptively on its 
own terms rather than in response to 
external pressures. That relatively benign 
position will not last. The opportunity 
should be grasped so that change is not 
precipitate and citizens and taxpayers can 
adjust their circumstances with time to 
spare. 
If that is to happen we have to turn 
a deaf ear to some apparently ‘easy’ 
solutions. Over the years a variety of 
‘painless’ remedies have been offered as 
alternatives to either curbing expenditure 
or raising taxes (or both) to generate the 
surpluses needed to reduce the stock of 
debt. The most seductive is to advocate 
higher rates of economic growth which 
will lift all boats, including government 
revenues. There are two problems with 
this approach. In the first place, there 
is no historic track record of the New 
Zealand economy sustaining a rate of 
growth higher than 2%. But even if such 
an economic growth rate were achieved, 
there is no way of ensuring that a 
significant share of higher tax revenues 
could be devoted to debt retirement. 
Economic growth brings with it rising 
expectations and ensuing distributional 
claims. 
An alternative remedy often advocated 
is a much more aggressive inward 
migration policy. There is a belief that a 
much larger population would underwrite 
higher productivity. To the extent that 
we could count on large numbers of 
(younger) skilled migrants of working 
age, a more productive workforce might 
seem a plausible outcome. But again, 
there are no guarantees. New Zealand 
cannot assume that it will be able to 
attract the people it thinks it wants – we 
have had 25,000 or more net migrants in 
only four of the past 60 years (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2012b). New Zealand does 
not occupy a global crossroads and so 
it cannot position itself as some sort of 
global emporium. Many other economies 
can offer higher densities of intellectual 
capital and more exciting opportunities. 
Human capital is for me the Achilles 
heel of New Zealand’s future ability to 
stay afloat. Currently we are managing 
to cover the outward migration of skills 
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with a matching inflow (Ministry of 
Economic Development et al., 2011). Very 
simply, if the human capital pipeline 
were disrupted, all bets are off. Even if 
we could significantly out-compete other 
countries for human capital, it is not a 
sustainable answer. Migrants cannot be 
held at arm’s length from the matrix of 
expectations and services that drive public 
expenditure. Migrants will demand health 
and education services like everyone else. 
They will also age. A larger, more vibrant 
population would very likely contribute 
to productivity growth, but whether it 
would be sufficient to reverse the public 
debt trajectory is another matter. 
So, how do we make progress from here?
The political conditions for making 
progress will be optimised if the factual 
boundaries of the policy debate can be 
broadly agreed upon and internalised. 
These cannot encompass strongly 
normative considerations. A very large 
element of public policy debate is about 
the distributional consequences of policy 
change. This is as true of debates over 
regulatory reform and property rights 
as it is of taxing and spending decisions. 
Those debates are evergreen. But it should 
be possible to agree that any solution set 
cannot ignore certain facts. Elected officials 
could make a constructive contribution 
to New Zealand’s future by accepting 
that policy options are constrained by the 
following propositions: 
• without policy change, demographic 
momentum will drive the current 
fiscal imbalance even further from 
balance, with a consequent build-up 
in the stock of public debt;
• recourse to policies designed to 
enhance productivity, however 
desirable, cannot alone be relied 
upon to close the spending gap;
• there are sufficient risks, nationally 
and globally, to assert that the 
climate for fiscal consolidation in the 
future is unlikely to be more benign;
• recent events confirm that sovereign 
borrowers enjoy no special immunity 
from the requirement of everyone 
to live within their means, and 
that low debt levels are essential 
if governments are to retain the 
‘firepower’ necessary to respond to 
costly, unforeseen disjunctive events;
• expenditure control and tax 
increases, in whatever proportions, 
are the only certain ways of 
generating the surpluses needed 
to bring the stock of debt down 
to a level at which that sovereign 
‘firepower’ can be protected;
• returning to fiscal balance and 
reducing debt is best done outside 
of a crisis context, and agreement on 
a trajectory and timetable need not 
preclude a vigorous debate about 
how to stay on that trajectory; and
• given that policy changes are 
likely to hold spending and 
taxing consequences that differ 
across generations, being able 
to communicate a clear long-
term trajectory is not only more 
economically efficient; it is also fairer 
to be transparent rather than leave 
the future permanently veiled in 
uncertainty. 
If a multi-party consensus around 
‘boundaries’ of this type could be agreed, 
New Zealanders could then turn their 
minds to the range of policy alternatives 
on offer from political parties, confident 
that their long-term security, if not 
guaranteed, was at least being argued 
within responsible bounds. 
But what are the chances of agreement 
on ‘boundaries’ today being respected in 
debate tomorrow? It is here that some 
institutional innovation might be useful. 
The review of the government’s long-
term fiscal position being led by the 
Treasury has been both sophisticated in 
its reach and ecumenical in its invited 
participation. But it has, inevitably, 
engaged a policy-literate élite and the 
Treasury, which serves the government 
of the day, cannot be on permanent 
referee duties. For that reason it might be 
worth entrusting the ‘guardianship’ of the 
debate to an independent entity which 
can comment directly on the consistency 
of policy settings, with the agreed need to 
keep debt and expenditure on sustainable 
tracks. 
That need not be an expensive or 
cumbersome business. The Treasury 
could, through an amendment to the 
Public Finance Act 1989, be charged 
with annually assessing the trajectory of 
policies currently in place against pre-
agreed criteria for fiscal sustainability. 
That analysis could be made available 
to an independent ‘Fiscal Sustainability 
Committee’, whose job it would be to 
provide a public commentary on the 
compatibility of policy settings with 
desired long-run outcomes. 
The terms of appointment, tenure 
and public outreach of such a committee 
to secure its independence and authority 
is beyond the scope of this article. New 
Zealand’s record as a public policy 
innovator gives some confidence that 
new approaches could be found given 
the will. That said, politicians have been 
jealous about infringements on the 
exercise of executive power. The fact 
that New Zealand remains a unicameral 
system with far fewer moving parts than 
most democracies is evidence of this. The 
control of fiscal policy lies at the heart 
of executive power in New Zealand, and 
going beyond formal scrutiny to some 
form of limitation or review would 
indeed be novel. 
... the current exercise provides more 
than enough evidence that prudence 
demands credible and durable 
responses to the fiscal consequences of 
demographic, financial and geopolitical 
trends.
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Let me conclude by saying that the 
current exercise provides more than 
enough evidence that prudence demands 
credible and durable responses to the 
fiscal consequences of demographic, 
financial and geopolitical trends. We 
don’t need more papers on the dynamics 
that compel this conclusion. We need 
sustained attention to the conditions that 
will permit our political institutions to 
deliver those responses.
1 This article is adapted from a presentation given to the 
Affording Our Future conference held at Victoria University 
of Wellington, 10–11 December 2012. The full paper 
contributed to the conference, ‘Long-term fiscal rules: 
New Zealand’s case in the context of OECD countries’, is 
available at http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/about/cpf/events/
affording-our-future-conference-2012/papers. The Treasury’s 
2013 long-term fiscal review is available on the Treasury 
website: http://www.treasury.govt.nz/government/longterm/
fiscalposition/2013.
2 The old-age support ratio, which is the number of people 
of working age (20–64) per person of pension age (65+), 
across OECD countries is projected to decrease from 4.2 in 
2008 to just 2.1 by 2050. The old-age support ratio in New 
Zealand is projected to decrease from 4.7 in 2008 to 2.4 by 
2050 (OECD, 2011).
3 The baseline case (with no policy change) for the OECD 
Environmental Outlook to 2050 (OECD 2012) projects the 
global economy to almost quadruple by 2050, from $75 
trillion to $300 trillion. The OECD’s share of the global 
economy will decline from a little over half of global Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (54%) to less than a third (31%).
4 The OECD outlook’s baseline case projects that the world 
is on course for a 3–6 degree increase in global average 
temperature by the end of the century (2–3 degrees by 
2050), a 55% increase in demand for water (with 40% of 
the world’s population living in areas of severe water stress 
by 2050), a further 10% decline in biodiversity by 2050, 
and more than double the number of premature deaths 
from airborne pollution (particulate matter and ground level 
ozone).
5  New Zealand Superannuation is a fortnightly payment 
from the government for people aged 65 years and over. 
For further information about the policy see: http://www.
workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/a-z-benefits/nz-
superannuation.html.
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